The Federal Courts Under Section 301 by Hoebreckx, O. S.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 4 Spring 1960 Article 2
The Federal Courts Under Section 301
O. S. Hoebreckx
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
O. S. Hoebreckx, The Federal Courts Under Section 301, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 417 (1960).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol43/iss4/2
FEDERAL COURTS UNDER SECTION 301
0. S. HOEBPECKX*
I. LEADING UP TO LINCOLN MILLS
The Eightieth Congress, in the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947, granted the federal courts jurisdiction over suits brought by
or against labor organizations for violation of contracts, and made
unions liable as an entity for the payment of money damages.' This
statute, as construed by the United States Supreme Court in the Lincoln
Mills2 case, opened up a wholly new and practically uncharted area
for the intervention of federal courts in union-management disputes.
Prior to the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act in
1947, the activity of the federal courts in the field of union-manage-
ment disputes was largely limited to issues arising under the Railway
Labor Act, the review and enforcement of orders as issued by the
National Labor Relations Board,, a few injunction cases where the
employer considered it possible to meet the rigid requirements of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and an occasional case brought against a union
as co-defendant with an employer in a Sherman Antitrust case.
The suability of unions as an entity in the federal courts is not a
novel concept in American jurisprudence. That issue was decided in
1922 in the first Coronado Coal Co.3 case.
In that case, Chief Justice Taft, writing for a unanimous court,
after referring to numerous federal statutes which had recognized
unions as entities, stated:
In this state of federal legislation, we think that such or-
ganizations are suable in the federal courts for their acts, and
*Partner Robertson, Hoebreckx & Davis; L.L.B. George Washington, 1937;
formerly NLRB Field Examiner; Industry member, Chicago Regional War
Labor Board; author, "Management Handbook for Collective Bargaining."
This article was prepared with the research assistance of William Fitzhugh Fox
of the Law Review staff.
'Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) §301(a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §185 (a) (1952). "Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organ-
ization, may be brought in any district court of the United States havingjurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." §301(b). "Any labor organ-
ization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as de-
fined in this Act, and any employer whose activities affect commerce as de-
fined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets,
and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets."
2Lincoln Mills of Alabama v. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 448, 32 L.C. 70,733
(1957).3 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
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that the funds accumulated to be expended in conducting strikes
are subject to execution in suits for torts committed by such
unions in strikes. The fact that the Supreme Court of Arkansas
has since taken a different view in Baskins v. United Mine
Workers of America, supra, cannot under the Conformity Act
operate as a limitation on the federal procedure in this regard.4
However, the right of employers to bring suits against unions for
contract violations in the federal courts was limited by minimum
amount and diversity of citizenship requirements, and later by the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,5 passed by
Congress in 1932.
Congress, in 1935, passed the Wagner Act, 6 imposing on employers
the legal obligation to bargain collectively with a union that had been
selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. The
National Labor Relations Board, however, was not given authority to
enforce labor agreements. As a result, the question of union re-
sponsibility for its contracts was a major item of consideration by
Congress in the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947. Report No. 45, issued by the majority of the House Labor Com-
mittee, sought to justify giving federal courts jurisdiction in contract
dispute cases as follows:
When labor organizations make contracts with employers,
such organizations should be subject to the same judicial reme-
dies and processes in respect of proceedings involving violations
of such contracts as those applicable to all other citizens. Labor
organizations cannot justifiably ask to be treated as responsible
contracting parties unless they are willing to assume the respon-
sibilities of such contracts to the same extent as the other party
must assume his. Public opinion polls in evidence before the
committee show that nearly 75 percent of the union members
themselves concur in this view. For this reason, not only does
the section, as heretofore pointed out, make the labor organiza-
tion equally suable, but it also makes the Norris-LaGuardia Act
inapplicable in suits and proceedings involving violations of
contracts which labor organizations voluntarily and with their
eyes open enter into.7
The House Minority Report also assumed that the purpose for
giving federal courts jurisdiction in union contract violation disputes
was primarily directed against unions. The minority pointed out that
there were only 13 states where union funds could not be reached in
satisfaction of judgment, and that there were 25 states which permit
suits against unions as an entity." The minority announced that re-
4 Id. at 576.
547 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§101-13 (1952).
649 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§151-68 (1952).
7 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, at 337.
s Id. at 399-400.
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.moving the $3,000 jurisdictional amount would "involve the federal
courts already overburdened with a great mass of petty litigation."
The debate in both the Senate and the House also indicates that
Congress assumed that the main function of the bill would be to pro-
vide employers with an adequate remedy for union contract violations.
Senator Taft, commenting on this section of the bill, stated:
As a matter of law, unions, of course, are liable in theory
on their contracts today, but as a practical matter, it is difficult
to sue them.10
Senator Ball also contended that employers should have an easier way
to sue labor unions for contract violations.:" Senator Pepper, an ar-
"ticulate opponent of the Taft-Hartley Act, characterized this section
as "authorizing suits in the federal courts against labor organizations
with the right of recovery against their treasuries, all their dues, all
their assets-."' 2 Senator Hatch characterized the section as a "salutary
provision," but professed to fear that employers might "use it as a
means of harrassing unions and decreasing their effectiveness by filing
actions indiscriminately every time one member of a union deviates
slightly from the terms of his contract."' 3
The fears of the opponents, of course, never did materialize. Labor
agreements, as we know them in the United States, impose very few
affirmative obligations on a union. Essentially, the only enforceable
right against a labor union that the employer secures in the average
labor agreement is the right to have disputes over compliance with the
contract determined through the process of arbitration rather than
through strike action. While undoubtedly the right of an employer to
sue a union for damages for violation of a no-strike clause has tended
to reduce strikes in violation of contract commitments, the fact is that
very few employers have used Section 301, either to collect damages
or in an effort to enjoin strike action.
On the other hand, unions, because of the very nature of labor
agreements, have turned what was characterized as an anti-union piece
of legislation in 1947 into a tremendous asset during the 12 years that
followed the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. An analysis of the cases
reported in 37 Labor Cases, covering cases reported from late April
to late August 1959, brought in the federal courts under Section 301,
shows that 18 actions were brought by unions against employers, and
11 were brought by employers against unions. Only 8 of the reported
cases during this period involved a suit in which an employer brought
an action for damages for contract violation against a union. Fifteen
9Id. at 400.
10 Id. at 1014, 1654.
21 Id. at 1497, 1524.
22 Id. at 1600.
13 Id. at 1483.
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of the cases involved issues which arose out of the arbitration pro-
visions in labor agreements. Most of these cases dealt with a situation
where the union was requesting the court's assistance in compelling an
employer to arbitrate a specified dispute which the employer contended
was not arbitrable under the labor agreement.
Prior to arbitration legislation, the courts, applying the common
law, uniformly held that an agreement between parties to arbitrate any
future dispute that may arise between them was not enforceable. The
ground generally assigned was that agreements to arbitrate such dis-
putes constituted an attempt to oust the courts from normal juris-
diction.14 This common law doctrine was subsequently changed by ac-
tion of many state legislatures enacting statutes which authorized the
state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. However, most of these
laws exempted "employment contracts" from the provisions of the
statute. The Wisconsin statute exempted from its provisions "con-
tracts between employers and employees or between employers and
associations of employees."'1 5 The United States Supreme Court sus-
tained the validity of the New York Arbitration Act, in Red Cross Line
v. Atlantic Fruit Co.16 A federal arbitration act, also excluding from
its coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce," was passed in 1925, which law later was made part of the
Federal Code in 1947.17 The combination of the U.S. Arbitration Act
and Section 301 was the original springboard for injecting into the
federal courts many disputes involving the application of labor ar-
bitration agreements.
It early appeared that the principal obstacle to an expansion of
federal court activity in the labor arbitration field was the "contracts
of employment" exemption as contained in Section 1 of the U.S.
Arbitration Act. The question became-what was a "contract of em-
ployment." The Supreme Court had held in 1944 that:
Collective bargaining between employer and the representa-
tivese of a unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to
terms which will govern hiring and work and pay in that unit.
The result is not, however, a contract of employment except in
rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obligation
to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it alone.
The negotiations between union and management result in what
14 U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1007
(S.D. N.Y. 1915). "There has long been a variety of available reasons for
refusing to give effect to the agreement of men of mature age . . . when
the intended effect of the agreement was to prevent proceedings in any and
all courts and substitute therefor the decision of the arbitrators."
15 Wis. Stat. §298.01 (1957).
18264 U.S. 109 (1927).
'7 U.S. Arbitration Act, 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1952).
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often has been called a trade agreement, rather than in a con-
tract of employment.'8
In this same year, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit refused to stay an action by an employee for wages allegedly
due under a collective bargaining agreement on the theory that the
employee here was suing under a "contract of employment," and that,
therefore, the U.S. Arbitration Act did not apply.19
On April 25, 1956, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
Local 205, UE v. General Electric Co.,20 followed the Sixth Circuit,
holding that collective bargaining agreements were not "contracts of
employment" within the purview of the U.S. Arbitration Act, and speci-
fically enforced the provisions of an arbitration clause in the labor
agreement before it. This case was ultimately appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.2 1
In the meantime, the Third Circuit, in Amalgamated Association
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Linese, Inc., 22 and the Fifth Circuit, in
Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union,23 followed a contrary route,
holding that collective bargaining agreements were contracts of employ-
ment within the prohibition of the U.S. Arbitration Act. These courts
held that, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 301, the federal
courts were without authority to grant relief specifically enforcing ar-
bitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. The Lincoln
Mills and the Local 205 cases converged in the U.S. Supreme Court
at the same time and were disposed of by decisions issued on the
same day.
The Circuit Courts of Appeal, prior to the Supreme Court decision
in Lincoln Mills, had also been wrestling with the problem as to
whether or not Section 301 required the federal courts to apply state
law to the contract issues presented for decision. One line of cases
held that Section 301 was merely jurisdictional, and not the source
of new substantive rights. This line was followed by the Fifth,
24
Seventh,25 and Tenth26 Circuits. Other appellate courts held that Sec-
tion 301 created substantive rights under federal law and:
1 8 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 at 334, 8 L.C. 51, 173 (1944).
19 Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 8 L.C. 62,199 (6th cir. 1944). See also
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs Union, 217 F.2d 49,
27 L.C. 68,817 (6th cir. 1954).
20 233 F.2d 85, 30 L.C. 69,908 (1st cir. 1956) aff'd. 353 U.S. 547, 32 L.C. 70,735
(1957).
21 Ibid.
22 192 F.2d 310, 20 L.C. 66,616 (3d cir. 1951).
23 230 F.2d 81, 29 L.C. 69,729 (5th cir. 1956).24 Int'l Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th cir.
1956).
25 United Steel Workers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th cir.
1957).26 Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th cir.
1951).
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* . . authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal
law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agree-
ments and includes within that federal law specific performance
of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining
agreements.17
The Second 28 Third,2 9 Fourth2 0 Sixth3 1 Eighth, 2 and Ninth33 Cir-
cuits followed this line. The United States Supreme Court, in Lincoln
Mills, completely disregarded the "contract of employment" issue raised
under the U.S. Arbitration Act. The court elected to approach the
problem more broadly and simply held that Section 301 was more than
jurisdictional, that 301 created substantive rights, and further directed
the federal courts to utilize their "judicial inventiveness '34 in develop-
ing a body of federal law to be applied in these situations. 5
Particularly in the field of labor arbitartion, the majority opinion
written by Justice Douglas, has opened wide the door of the federal
courts for employers and unions desiring to litigate disputes arising
under collective bargaining agreements. Practitioners in the field of
union-management relations will have a rare opportunity to contribute
to the molding of a body of federal law which will have important im-
plications on political and economic developments in the United States.
Rightly or wrongly, the United States Supreme Court has directed the
lower federal courts to legislate in this field, and this legislation will
be enacted without any public hearing or debate. The quality of the
body of law to be developed will therefore depend to a large extent
on the awareness of the attorneys for the contesting parties that they
are not only representing their clients in the litigation, but have broad
responsibilities to the public for a thorough and fair presentation of
the issue or issues involved. There can be little question that the courts,
in applying and construing federal and state laws affecting union-man-
agement relations, have contributed substantially to the position of
power, both political and economic, that unions in the United States
enjoy today. Under the mandate of Lincoln Mills and without the
guiding restraint of specific legislation, except as may be found in the
labor contracts involved in the disputes presented, federal courts will
27 Supra note 2, at 451.
28 Shirley-Herman Co. v. Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d cir. 1950).29 Ass'n of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.2d
623 (3d cir. 1955) aff'd on other grounds 348 U.S. 437.
30 Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills, 193 F.2d 529 (4th cir. 1951).31 Milk and Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie Milk Prod. Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th
cir. 1953).32 United Electrical R. and M. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376 (8th
cir. 1953).
3 Schatte v. Int'l Alliance, 182 F.2d 158 (9th cir. 1950).
34 Supra note 2, at 457.
35 The significance of the majority opinion in the Lincoln Mills case was empha-
sized in a lengthy and learned dissent by Justice Frankfurter in which he
questioned the majority holding and went on from there to question the con-
s'ittiti-nality of this "-ant of jurisdcticn.
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be in a position to influence seriously the trend in labor-management
relations for years to come. The federal courts, in fashioning this
body of law, shall have to take care that their "inventions" are not
the medicines that kill the American economic system.
II. ARBITRATION UNDER 301
At the present time, it appears that the most fertile field for the
iritervention of the federal courts in union-nmanagement disputes is in
the area of labor arbitration. The type of case most frequently pre-
sented to the federal courts in the arbitration field is the case wherein
the court is asked to determine whether or not a particular dispute is
arbitrable under the parties' labor agreement. The issue most often
arises where the employer, and occasionally the union, refuses to pro-
ceed with arbitration of a contract dispute. However the issue of ar-
bitrability can also be raised in connection with a motion for a stay
of court proceedings to permit arbitration under the parties' agree-
ment. The third type of situation in which arbitrability has been raised,
and may be raised more often in the future, is where an action is
brought under Section 301, either to enforce or vacate an arbitration
award, and the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the dispute is
contested.
While it hardly can be contended that the courts, both federal and
state, have been unsympathetic to union causes litigated in the last
30 years, the trend in the current cases indicates that the unions still
prefer to have a private arbitrator determine the issue rather than a
court. One of the reasons for this preference, of course, is the fact
that there is no appeal from an arbitrator's decision, and since the
union is almost invariably the aggressor in arbitration cases, it has
everything to gain and nothing to lose from the arbitration proceeding.
The union, having gained a favorable decision, prefers to avoid the risk
of reversal on appeal. The other reason, of course, why unions would
rather try their issues before an arbitrator arises from the fact that
many labor dispute arbitrators agree with the concept that a collective
bargaining agreement is a "living document," and that the function
of an arbitrator is not to determine issues presented on a judicial
basis-that is, applying the contract as he finds it-but rather to ap-
proach the problem in the light of what the arbitrator considers to be
sound industrial relations policy and proceeding therefrom on a legis-
lative or mediational basis. Many unions have discovered that they can
secure through the arbitration process what they were unable to secure
through collective bargaining. Unions assume, and properly so, that
the courts will take a judicial approach in determining the rights of
the parties under their agreement. Experience has also demonstrated,
as manifested in the 1959-60 steel strike, that once a union secures
1960]
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concessions through the arbitration process, it is next to impossible to
correct the situation through subsequent collective bargaining.
Federal policy is clearly opposed to compulsory arbitration of labor
disputes, but admittedly encourages "voluntary" arbitration of such
disputes. Title II of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
provides that it is the policy of the United States that:
, . * the settlement of issues between employers and em-
ployees through collective bargaining may be advanced by mak-
ing available full and adequate governmental facilities for con-
ciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encour-
age employers and the representatives of their employees to
reach and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours,
and working conditions, and to make all reasonable ecorts to
settle their differences by mutual agreement reached through
conferences and collective bargaining or by such methods as may
be provided in any applicable agreement for the settlement of
disputes,3" (emphasis added)
and later provides that employers and unions shall:
• . . whenever a dispute arises over the terms or applica-
cation of a collective-bargaining agreement and a conference
is requested by a party or prospective party thereto, arrange
promptly for such a conference to be held and endeavor in such
conference to settle such dispute expeditiously ;37
The question of compulsory arbitration in connection with national
emergency disputes was considered by Congress in connection with the
passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, and was
rejected. Notwithstanding that fact, certain labor relations experts, not
immediately connected or affected by what they propose, have con-
stantly suggested compulsory arbitration, particularly with disputes
affecting the national interest. On the other hand, employers and unions
have almost invariably opposed such proposals. But we are not here
concerned with the arbitration of basic labor agreements in the
legislative sense, as is ordinarily involved in the proposals before
Congress. We are, however, concerned with the concept of voluntary
arbitration of disputes under existing labor arguments. Arbitration
ceases to be voluntary when a party to an agreement is compelled to
accept the decision of an arbitrator over an issue which the parties did
not either specifically or impliedly agree to submit to arbitration.
Arbitration under such circumstances, in effect, amounts to compul-
sory arbitration.
Despite the former and inherent reluctance on the part of the
courts to abdicate their jurisdiction in favor of private arbitration,
there has been in recent years a tendency on the part of the courts
3661 Stat. 152 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §171(b) (1952).
3761 Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §174(a) (2) (1952).
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to construe arbitration clauses in labor agreements "liberally" or to
decree private arbitration on the theory that public policy encourages
arbitration in labor cases without too much regard to the explicit terms
of the labor agreement. Such an approach not only implies the necessity
of employing different standards when construing a labor agreement,
but also negates the fundamental principal that a party to a contract
is entitled to have any dispute under that contract determined by the
courts unles he explicitly authorizes some private party to determine
the dispute. In this way the courts have contributed substantially to
expanding the role of the private arbitrator. While, at the present time,
unions are ordinarily the beneficiaries of such decisions, time has a
way of changing the circumstances. Unions, in the light of their rising
economic power, may find themselves embarrassed by decisions which
they have successfully sought when, under different circumstances,
they may prefer to use that economic power rather than permit an
arbitrator influenced by a changed public opinion to determine the issue.
The question of arbitrability under labor contracts was not always
so lightly dealt with by the courts. The courts of the State of New
York, which prior to Lincoln Mills, had developed a vast experience
in connection with labor arbitration issues, were formerly inclined to
give strict application to labor arbitration agreements. In the .AM v.
Cutler-Hammers case, decided in 1947, the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division held:
If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be
arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbi-
trate, and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitra-
tion.3 9
The court's per curiam opinion also significantly asserted:
While the contract provides for arbitration of disputes as to
the 'meaning, performance, non-performance or application' of
of its provisions, the mere assertion by a party of a meaning of
a provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the
words cannot make an arbitrable issue. 0
Another New York Appellate Division, two years later, reaffirmed
Cutler-Hammer and held:
If there is no real ground of claim, the court may refuse to
allow arbitration, although the alleged dispute may fall within
the literal language of the arbitration agreement. 1
It should be noted that, in both of the above mentioned cases, the
38271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y. 2d 317, 12 L.C. 63,574 (1947) aff'd 297 N.Y. 519,
74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
39 Id. at 318.
40 Ibid.
4" General Electric v. United Electrical Workers, 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E.2d 181,
182 (1949).
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union alleged a violation of a specific provision in the contract, but the
court, applying the fact situation against the arbitration provisions of
the contract, in essence found the claim baseless and refused to order
arbitration. A United States Court of Appeals, as late as 1956, in
Local 205, UE v. General Electric Co.42 seemed to reaffirm the
Cutler-Hammer doctrine by asserting that, if the claim of arbitrability
is not frivolous or patently baseless, the court may issue an order
directing arbitration.43 The Federal Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit also seemed to reaffirm this position in Engineers Association
v. Spery Gyroscope Co."4
The courts are in uniform agreement that the issue of arbitrability
is for the court to decide in the first instance unless the parties, by their
agreement, specifically authorize the arbitrator to determine his own
jurisdiction. As the Cutler-Hammer and other decisions indicate, the
court very often, in determining the arbitrability of the issue, at the
same time in effect determines the merits of the case. If the union's
claim does not assert an actual violation of the contract, it is not ar-
bitrable. The court, in order to find the issue arbitrable, is required
almost at least impliedly to find a contract violation.
The Second Circuit, in the Engineers Assn. case, was faced with
this quandary and dealt with it as follows:
It should be observed, however, that even in a case such as
the present one, where the same facts are determinative of both
arbitrability and the merits of the controversy, an order com-
pelling the parties to submit to arbitration does not impinge
upon the power of the arbitrator to decide the merits of the
dispute. The difference between the two proceedings is in the
quantum of proof necessary for the moving party to obtain re-
lief. In the arbitration hearing, the party seeking relief must
fully establish his claim that the opposing party has violated the
contract. Determination of arbitrability only requires that the
moving party produce evidence which tends to establish his claim.
Once the tendency of the evidence to support the claim has been
established, it is then the function of the arbitrator to weigh
all the evidence and to then determine whether the contract was
broken.
4
.
This quantum of proof theory requires some delicate balancing on
the part of the court. As a practical matter, an arbitrator determining
42 Supra note 20.
43 In Local 205, U.E. v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 at 101 (1st cir. 1956)
the court said: "The scope of an arbitration pledge is solely for the parties to
set, and thus the determination of whether a particular dispute is arbitrable
is a problem of contract interpretation." And later the court held: "Thus
the district court must first determine whether the contract in suit puts
matters of arbitrability to the arbitrators or leaves them for decision by the
court."
44251 F.2d 133 (2d cir. 1956) cert. denied 356 U.S. 932 (1957).
45 Id. at 137.
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a dispute under the circumstances of the Engineers Assn. case, would
certainly require considerable new evidence not presented in the court
proceeding to find against the union. While the courts may attempt
to save the situation as did the New Bedford Defense Prod. Div. of
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Automobile Workers, Local 1113, by
asserting:
Issues do not lose their quality of arbitrability because they
can be correctly decided only one way46
it would appear that, as found in Cutler-Hammer, if the claim is base-
less, there is no ground or reasonable basis for submitting the issue to
arbitration on the alleged merits.
The trend away from Cutler-Hammer, as manifested in the En-
gineers Assn. and the Firestone cases, 47 reached full fruition in a case
decided on September 29, 1959, by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit: Local 1912, 1AM v. U.S. Potash Co.48
In that case, the union filed a grievance against the company, claim-
ing that it violated the contract by subcontracting work on its premises
which fell within the employee's job classification set up in the con-
tract. The parties' agreement contained no clause specifically prohibit-
ing such subcontracting. The parties' agreement provided that the nor-
mal management functions:
* * * are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Company
anl not subject to Union action or consent or to arbitration except
such ... conditions of employment affecting the employer-em-
ployee relationships as are specifically provided for in the terms
of this agreement . . .; and in the 'Arbitration Article,' that(only a question or questions as to the proper interpretation or
application of any of the provisions of this agreement may be
submitted to arbitration.'4 9 (emphasis added)
The company refused to arbitrate the subcontracting grievance on
the ground that it was not covered by any of the provisions of the
bargaining contract. The court, adopting the "issues do not lose their
quality of arbitration because they can be correctly decided only one
way" approach, assessed its role in this situation in the following
language:
We interpret only to determine whether the grievance dis-
pute can be fairly said to present a question as to the inter-
pretation or application of the contract. If so, the judicial func-
tion is at an end and the proper interpretation of the contract is
for the arbitrator.50
46258 F.2d 522 at 527, 35 L.C. 71,716 (1st cir. 1958).
47 See also Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482(1959).
48270 F.2d 496, 38 L.C. 65,787 (10th dr. 1959).
49Id. at 497.
50 Id. at 498.
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One might ask as to what is left for the "proper interpretation" by
the arbitrator after the court has found, as it must, that the contract in
some ways limits the right of the employer to do what the union has
complained of. The issue that will have to be determined by the ar-
bitrator, as it was by the court, is whether or not the contract prohibits
the subcontracting complained of by the union.
The court overlooked the obvious fact that, had the parties intended
by their agreement to outlaw subcontracting, they would have found
language to do so. The same court, in a later case, held:
* * * and courts have affirmed the right, whether inherent or
expressed, to subcontract work usually performed by employees,
without violating its bargaining contract, in the absence of an
expressed agreement not to do so. 5
Disregarding this fact and the limiting language in the agreement, the
court asserted that the mere fact that the contract did not prohibit sub-
contracting "does not necessarily mean that subcontracing is excluded
from the scope of the bargaining agreement." Instead, the court, in its
opinion, talks about "interpretative implications of coverage . . . im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealings . . . the very life blood
of collective bargaining agreements . . . the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract. . . ." The court, taking a typical
arbitrator's approach in determining the rights of the parties under the
contract, defined its duty in the following language:
It would stifle the underlying purposes of the whole agree-
ment to construe it according to its dry words. It is for us to
meat on the skeleton rather than tear the flesh from the bones. 52
The most significant aspect of the U.S. Potash decision is that the
court, in effect, puts the burden of proving lack of arbitrability on the
defense, thus, even rejecting the quantum of proof doctrine enunciated
by the Second Circuit in the Engineers Assn. case, supra. The court
in U.S. Potash case observed:
The contract is not couched in terms of specified grievances
which are to be arbitrated, thereby excluding all others by im-
plication. Nor does it specify the grievances5 3 which are not to be
arbitrated, thereby including all others.
The court sums up its position in this respect by stating:
* * * it is plain that the grievance dispute does not lie wholly
outside the provisions of the contract, and arbitration is there-
fore enforceable.M
51 Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d -, 38 L.C. 66,016 (10th cir.
1959).
2 Id. at -.53 Supra note 48, at 498.54 Id. at 499. See contra, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 269
F.2d 633, 37 L.C. 65,675 (5th cir. 1959).
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It is apparent that, if the Tenth Circuit is right in this decision,
the whole basic concept of voluntary arbitration has been altered. The
approach now, at least in labor arbitration cases, is that a party to a
labor agreement is obligated to arbitrate any dispute which is claimed
to arise under that agreement unless the agreement specifically ex-
cludes such grievance from arbitration. Union-management negotiators,
at least in the Tenth Circuit, are put on notice that the old "interpreta-
tion and application" clauses are of little value to parties desiring to
avoid "open end" arbitration obligations.
Labor agreements very often provide that either time limits or
specific procedures, or both, must be followed as a condition precedent
to arbitration. These time limit provisions, particularly important in
discharge, layoff, and other cases involving accumulating financial lia-
bility, are often stated in terms of waiver of the grievance if the griev-
ance is not appealed within certain time limits. Whether these limita-
tions are stated in terms of condition precedent or waiver, the ques-
tion arises as to whether or not it is for the court or the arbitrator to
determine the arbitrability of the grievance. In most situations, particu-
larly where a waiver is involved, the defending party will normally
present the non-compliance with the time provisions as a defense in
the arbitration proceeding. However, because of the disinclination of
arbitrators to enforce what they refer to very often as "the technical
provisions" of the agreement, there may be situations where a court
determination of the question may be preferable.
The courts have treated such procedural clauses as going to the
heart of arbitrability, and have regarded such issues as matters for pre-
liminary determination by the court rather than by the arbitrator.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in the Boston Mutual
Life Insurance Co. case, held specifically:
... whether the employer had agreed to submit this matter
to arbitration depends upon a determination by the court as a
preliminary matter, whether all the conditions precedent to ar-
bitration have been fulfilled .... 5-
The court premised its holding on the classic concept that the au-
thority of an arbitrator to determine such an issue must be based on
a promise in the collective bargaining agreement to submit the issue
of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Seventh Circuit, in a recent case,
Brass & Copper Workers v. American Brass Co.,56 Dec. 1959, followed
the rationale of the Boston Mutual case, and affirmed a decision of the
district court which held that, where the union failed to comply with
the specific procedural requirements of the contract, it had waived its
55 Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Insurance Agents Union, 258 F.2d 516
at 522, 35 L.C. 71,715 (1st cir. 1958).
56 273 F.2d -, 38 L.C. 66,049 (7th cir. 1959).
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right to arbitrate the grievance, and the employer's refusal to arbitrate
was justified.
While objections to this approach have been voiced by certain pro-
fessional arbitrators, it would appear that, in these procedural cases,
just as in the other arbitrability cases, there is no reason for a court
to refer to arbitration an issue which is not arbitrable under the pro-
visions of the parties' agreement.
Section 10 of the U.S. Arbitration Act,57 as well as the usual state
arbitration act, authorizes the courts to vacate an award where an
award was procured by fraud, where there is evident partiality by the
arbitrator, and most importantly, where the arbitrator has exceeded his
powers. 5 We are primarily concerned with situafions wherein the juris-
diction of the arbitrator to determine the particular dispute is raised.
As has been pointed out, the normal procedure is to raise the ques-
tion of arbitrability before arbitration proceedings are undertaken and
an award is issued. However, in the labor relations field, most em-
ployers are reluctant to litigate labor disputes and are inclined to per-
mit the arbitrator to determine the question of arbitrability in the first
instance. If such is to be the approach, and in the absence of specific
covering provisions in the union agreement, the party raising the issue
as to arbitrability should make it clear, not only during the grievance
steps preceding the arbitration, but in the papers resulting in the ap-
pointment of the arbitrator and at the arbitration hearing itself, that
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is being questioned and that the right
is reserved to review the question of arbitration in a court proceeding
after the award is issued.
While it is a fundamental principle of law that an order, judgment,
or award issued by a tribunal having no authority to issue such an
award is a nullity, the above procedure is suggested in recognition of
some court's inclination to "liberally" construe union agreements and
to avoid any contention or finding that the employer, by participating
in the arbitration proceeding, impliedly agreed to permit the arbitrator
to finally determine his own jurisdiction. If such a procedure is followed
and the arbitrator denies the grievance, either on a jurisdictional basis
or on the merits, the matter is disposed of, at least insofar as the pro-
testing party is concerned. If the arbitrator, in the view of the protest-
ing party, has acted in excess of the authority granted to him under
the parties' agreement, the protesting party, under either Section 301
or the U.S. Arbitration Act, as indicated above, can petition the court
to vacate the award. While the Supreme Court, in the Lincoln Mills
case, did not find that the U.S. Arbitration Act applies to union-man-
agement agreements, there is no apparent reason for the federal courts
5761 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §10 (1952).
58 Wis. Stat. §298.10 (1957).
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to disregard the public policy laid down in the U.S. Arbitration Act
with respect to enforcement and vacation of arbitration awards.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, prior to the Lincoln
Mills decision of the Supreme Court, held that the federal courts did
not have jurisdiction over an action to vacate an arbitration award
construing and applying a union agreement on the ground that, while
Section 301 granted jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments, an action to enforce an award purportedly under that agree-
ment did not come within the purview of Section 301.r, The court,
under its view that the U.S. Arbitration Act was not applicable, rested
its decision squarely on its assumption that an award must be consid-
ered separate and apart from the contract on which the award was
claimed to have been based.
This view, properly in the opinion of these writers, has not been
sustained in later decisions.60 The issue in these cases is whether or
not the arbitrator acted within the authority conferred upon him by the
parties' agreement. The award cannot be considered as anything else
than a determination by the arbitrator as to what the parties' agree-
ment is. The award has no substance without the supporting agreement.
If the court's reasoning in Mengel61 is sound, then likewise, the federal
courts have no jurisdiction to enforce an award under Section 301.
The Sixth Circuit appears to have reversed its view in a case decided
after the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Mills. In Kornman Co.
v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the Sixth Circuit stated:
If the United States District Courts have jurisdiction and
may order compliance with the grievance arbitration provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement, they must necessarily have
jurisdiction to enforce the resulting awards. To hold otherwise
would render the entire arbitration machinery merely time con-
suming and useless.62
Likewise, the careful negotiation of union-management agreements
is a useless waste of time where either party to the agreement can,
through the arbitration process, substantially add to or negate the spe-
cific provisions of such agreements. The courts, having been assigned
the responsibility by Congress, at least in part, to police and enforce
union-management agreements, and having found requisite authority
to enforce arbitration awards, are not less obligated to uphold the
59Mengel Co. v. Nashville Paper Products, 221 F.2d 644, 27 L.C. 69, 118 (6th
cir. 1955). See also Int'l. News Service v. Gereczy, 160 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958).60 Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
61 Supra note 59.
62 264 F.2d 733 at 737, 36 L.C. 65,234 (6th cir. 1959) ; Textile Workers v. Cone
Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th cir. 1959) cert. denied 361 U.S. 886 (1959), En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th cir.
1959), Electrical Workers, Local 130 v. Miss. Valley Electric Co., 38 L.C.
65, 739 (E.D. La. 1959).
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parties' agreement where such awards are either the result of bias,
fraud, or not authorized by the agreement itself. The clear federal
policy is to make both parties responsible for the commitments made
in union-management agreements. Courts, under Section 301, have the
obligation to enforce that policy. If an arbitrator, for whatever reason
he may have, issues an award in derogation of that policy, the federal
courts, under Section 301, and the policies set forth under the U.S.
Arbitration Act, have no alternative but to nullify the arbitrator's
action.
Unions are almost invariably the aggressors in arbitration situa-
tions. It is common knowledge that unions have used the arbitration
process with some success to accomplish results that could not be ob-
tained through collective bargaining. Employers, with their understand-
able passion for labor peace, have generally accepted the labor arbitra-
tion process. However, labor arbitration will survive only so long as
it provides a reasonable solution for the problems presented. If labor
arbitration is not applied to enforce the rights and obligations of both
parties to the labor agreement, it can be well expected that labor ar-
bitration will fall into disrepute. Employers and unions can ill afford
to have some third party, whose responsibility is completely terminated,
once the award is issued, determine in a binding award what is good
for the parties, rather than what are the rights and obligations of the
parties as they, themselves, have determined in their labor agreement.
What is good industrial relations is best left to the employer and the
union to work out rather than be gratuitously dictated in the arbitration
process. The solicitousness for union survival and prestige, if ever it
was, certainly is no longer justified. The majority of labor unions today
not only have the power but the competence to negotiate an acceptable
agreement. If collective bargaining is the essence of our national policy,
as the means and method of avoiding labor disputes, the product of
collective bargaining-that is, the union-management agreement-is
entitled to the greatest respect.
The best manner in which to keep labor arbitration respectable and
acceptable is to provide a means whereby the actions of arbitrators
who fail to meet their responsibility under the parties' agreement can
be nullified. If matters determined by arbitrators are not within the
terms of arbitration provisions of the contract or arbitrators in their
awards go beyond the contemplation of the parties as reflected in the
contract, arbitrators exceed their jurisdiction, and their awards should
be set aside in an appropriate court proceeding.63
What is being suggested here, as the aforementioned case indicates,
is not something new and radical in the field of labor arbitration.
63 Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 58 F. Supp. 132 (N.D.
Tex. 1943), aff'd 145 F.2d 62 (5th cir. 1944) cert. denied 324 U.S. 872 (1945).
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These principles have been recognized, as has been pointed out in both
the U.S. Arbitration Act and the Uniform arbitration acts found in
many states. All that is being suggested is that there is no reasonable
basis for construing, applying, and litigating a labor contract on a basis
different than other contracts are dealt with. The pontificating, found
in numerous arbitration and court decisions, about "liberally" constru-
ing labor agreements and the desirability of encouraging labor arbitra-
tion, are often simply lame excuses for either avoiding or expanding
on the specific agreement of the parties. Collective bargaining and labor
arbitration can best be protected and encouraged by giving full recogni-
tion to the policies set down by Congress of compelling both parties
to a labor agreement to comply with their agreements as made.
III. EQUITABLE RELIEF UNbER 301
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Lincoln
Mills, the entire history of Section 301 "indicates that the agreement
to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a
no-strike agreement." Likewise, the no-strike agreement is considered
as the quid pro quo of the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes.
The Supreme Court, in the majority opinion, seemed to quote with
approval a colloquy which occurred during the House debate which
specifically recognized that Section 301 "contemplates not only the
ordinary lawsuits for damages, but also such other remedied proceed-
ings, both legal and equitable, as might be appropriate in the circum-
stances."
65
It is conceded that, where a union, party to a labor agreement, either
breaches its agreement not to strike during the term of the contract,
or even in the absence of a no-strike clause, violates its agreement to
arbitrate all disputes, it is liable for damages. However, it is generally
recognized that a suit for damages in a strike situation is not always
an adequate remedy. While most international unions today have suf-
ficient financial resources to be collectible on a judgment, very often
local unions are the parties to labor agreements, and most local unions
could not meet a substantial judgment against them. Moreover, one of
the inevitable results of a strike insofar as an employer is concerned,
involves losses extending and accruing long after the strike has been
terminated; that is, the loss of future business. The courts understand-
ably are reluctant to award such speculative damages especially where
labor unions are concerned. The only adequate remedy against a strike
in violation of a contract is a prompt court order restraining the union
from authorizing, sanctioning, encouraging, or in any way assisting in
the conduct of the strike.
The question arises, of course, as to whether or not the Norris-
64 Supra note 2, at 455.
65 Id. at 455-6.
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LaGuardia Act,66 applies in these situations. While the Supreme Court
referred to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in Lincoln Mills, the decision
did not specifically reach this question. The decision simply states:
We see no justification in policy for restricting Section 301
(a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract
to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural re-
quirements of that (Norris-LaGuardia) Act.6 7
The court's reference to the quid pro quo relationship between ar-
bitration and no-strike clauses and its quotation from the legislative
history quoted above regarding the availability of "both legal and
equitable" proceedings seems to indicate that the Supreme Court would
not construe the Norris-LaGuardia Act as applicable in Section 301
situations.
In a 1953 case prior to Lincoln Mills, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit construed Section 301 as authorizing the injunctive
process for the full enforcement of the substantive rights created by
Section 301.68
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reached the
contrary result, holding that a strike called by a union in violation of
the arbitration provisions of an agreement, was a dispute within the
purview of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that the injunction sought
by the employer in that case was precluded by that law.
69
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Bull Steamship
Co. v. Seafarer's Intl. Union,70 likewise held that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction against a union strik-
ing in violation of a labor agreement. Chief Justice Clark of this
court, in an analysis of the Lincoln Mills decision, assumed that the
Supreme Court would differentiate between an injunction against an
employer preventing him from violating an arbitration clause and an
injunction against a union preventing the union from violating the no-
strike clause.
In April of 1959, the U. S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington issued a restraining order against a union requiring
the union to comply with the arbitration provisions in the contract and
to refrain from in any way contributing to an existing strike.71 The
Washington court rested its decision squarely on the majority opinion
in Lincoln Mills.
6647 Stat. 70 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §101 (1952).
67 Supra note 2, at 458.
68 Milk & Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie Milk Prod. Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th
cir. 1953).69W. L. Mead, Inc. v. IBT, Local Union 25, 217 F.2d 6 (1st cir. 1954).
70250 F.2d 326, 33 L.C. 71, 095 (2d cir. 1957) cert. denied 355 U.S. 932 (1958).71 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Tacoma Smelterman's Union, 175 F.
Supp. 750 (W.D. Wash. 1959).
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It would appear that, if, as the Supreme Court determined in
Lincoln Mills, employers and unions acquired substantive rights under
Section 301 in connection with union-management contract enforce-
ment, these substantive rights included in appropriate cases the remedy
'of an injunction. The emotional attitude toward labor injunctions which
led to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is hardly applicable in
a situation where the court is merely requiring the union to comply
with its contractual obligations.. Likewise, the sanctity of the right to
strike is not involved, since the employees, acting through their
authorized representative, have for the period of the agreement by
contract relinquished that right in return for the employer's agreement
to arbitrate contract disputes.
The prohibitions as contained in Sections 4, 5, and 7 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, are stated in terms of jurisdiction. Section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court, grants substantive rights to parties to union-
management agreements. The question that is raised, of course, is
whether or not Congress impliedly repealed the Norris-LaGuardia Act
insofar as it applies to contract violations, over which the federal courts
were given jurisdiction in Section 301. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
was passed in 1932 at a time when labor organizations were struggling
for existence. The Labor-Management Relations Act was passed in
1947 at a time when Congress was alarmed over the fact that unions
were calling strikes in violation of their contractual commitments.
There is nothing in Section 301 or its legislative history to indicate
that Congress intended to limit the type of remedy that could be
afforded by the federal courts. The legislative history quoted in Lincoln
Mills is to the contrary. The Supreme Court, in Lincoln Mills, made
it clear that Section 301 imposed upon the federal courts considerable
leeway in fashioning remedies in actions brought under Section 301.
But irrespective of Lincoln Mills there is authoritative precedent for
the principle that: (1) Subsequent legislation inconsistent with the
principles of earlier legislation will be considered as impliedly repealing
or amending the earlier act; and (2) If Congress declares an act
lawful or unlawful, there is no basis for distinguishing between the
remedies to be applied..
In U. S. v. Hutcheson,7 2 the question arose as to whether or not
certain secondary boycott activities of the Carpenters Union afforded
a basis for criminal prosecution under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
Supreme Court agreed that the acts set forth in the indictment were
crimes under the Sherman Antitrust Act,7 3 as amended by Section 20
of the Clayton Act, as the latter Act was construed by the Supreme
72312 U.S. 219 (1941).
73 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1952).
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Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering.7 4 The Clayton Act had
been passed in 1914. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, with its restrictions
on the federal courts in labor injunction cases, was passed by Congress
in 1932. While there is nothing in the Norris-LaGuardia Act which
specifically repeals any provision of the Sherman Anti-trust Act or
the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court found:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the fetters upon trade
union activities, which according to judicial construction, Sec-
tion 20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched. .. 75
The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose
of the Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union
activities as redefined by the later Act. In this light, Section 20
removes all such allowable conduct from the paint of being a
violation of any law of the United States, including the Sherman
law.7
6
Having come to the conclusion that the conduct complained of
could not be enjoined because of the provisions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, the court went on to find that, if conduct cannot be en-
joined, it cannot be made the subject of a criminal prosecution.
By the same token, it would appear that, if, under Section 301,
contract violations can be remedied by an award for damages, there is
no basis for assuming they cannot be remedied by an injunction. The
Supreme Court, in Hutcheson, adverted to the manifest design of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to afford protection for certain activities speci-
fied in that Act. As set forth in the Lincoln Mills opinion, the same
considerations exist in regard to Section 301 and manifest the intention
of Congress to provide equitable as well as legal remedies in contract
cases.
7
IV. STRIKE DAMAGES UNDER 301
Another problem that has been faced by the federal courts is: What
is the status of the labor agreement arbitration clause when the union
is sued in court for damages resulting from a strike in violation of the
labor agreement? The issue ordinarily is raised when, after the employer
74254 U.S. 443 (1921).
S5Supra note 72, at 231.
76 Id. at 236.
77Note Independent Petroleum WArorkers of N.J. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235
F.2d 401 (3d cir. 1956) where the company refused to negotiate new job
classifications, and the union brought suit under 301 seeking specific per-
formance of the collective bargaining agreement. The court held that the
company must negotiate with the union on a salary rate for the new job
classification since such negotiations were provided for in the contract. The
reasoning of the court was that since it had so often held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was not a bar to granting injunctive relief to enforce arbitra-
tion provisions in contracts, it was not a bar here to enforce negotiation
provisions. Note also Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarer's Int'l Union 155 F.
Supp. 739 (E.D. N.Y. 1957) where the court gives a number of good reasons
for allowing equitable relief in the form of injunction when there has been
a breach of a "no-strike" clause.
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has filed a complaint against the union for damages resulting from
the alleged illegal strike, the union moves for a stay of proceedings
pending arbitration under the provisions of the labor agreement.
It is recognized that, where the union engages in a strike in violation
of a no-strike clause, the employer is entitled to terminate the agree-
ment at his election.78 However, in the usual situation, this right
to terminate is small comfort to the employer, since the union undoubt-
edly called a strike because it found its own agreement burdensome.
Termination under those circumstances simply plays into the union's
hands and imposes on the employer the obligation to negotiate a whole
new agreement if the union continues to represent a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit. A more practical action for the
employer to take is to bring suit to enjoin the strike and for damages
arising out of the contract violation.
The issue as to whether or not the proceedings should be stayed has
ordinarily been raised in connection with a damage suit. The union,
preferring to have its liability and damage, if any, determined by an
arbitrator instead of a court, moves for a stay of proceedings under
Section 3 of the U. S. Arbitration Act, which provides in part that the
court, upon application, shall "stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such aritration." 79
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit was faced with this
issue in a case s decided in 1948 prior to Lincoln Mills. The agreement
in that case provided that there shall be no strikes or lockouts, but
that the grievance procedure shall be the only method of settling dis-
putes "which are the subject of this agreement." While the court in
its opinion held that the U. S. Arbitration Act did not apply and that,
therefore, the court was not required to grant a stay if the issue was
arbitrable, the court held that, at least under this contract, there was
no obligation to arbitrate a claim for damages resulting from an illegal
strike. The court stated:
Damages arising from strikes and lockouts could not reason-
ably be held subject to arbitration under a procedure which ex-
pressly forbids strikes and lockouts and provides for the settle-
ment of grievances in order that they may be avoided."-
The court recognizes that the parties could have agreed to arbitrate
strike damage claims and implied that, if the contract could be so
78Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge #751, 188 F.2d
356 (9th cir. 1951).
79 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §3 (1952).
80 Int'l Union, United Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th cir. 1948).
81 Id. at 35.
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construed, a stay would have been granted. This was simply a recog-
nition of the fundamental principle that parties to a contract can be
compelled only to arbitrate such disputes as they have agreed to arbi-
trate.
The Seventh Circuit, in Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper
Handlers' Union #34, s2 without deciding, but assuming that the U. S.
Arbitration Act applied, reached the same result as did the Fourth
Circuit in the Colonial Hardwood case. In the Cuneo case, the union
called a strike over a grievance after rejecting the employer's demand
that the grievance be arbitrated. The contract, in addition to providing
for a no-strike clause, specifically provided:
It is agreed that the procedures herein provided for settling
disputes by arbitration shall be used to the exclusion of any
other means available to the parties who execute this Agree-
ment, it being understood that all arbitration decisions rendered
under the terms of this contract are final and binding on both
parties. Any rights or remedies otherwise available to the parties
to this contract are hereby expressly waived. 3
The court, in its opinion, observed that the union had ignored the
grievance procedure and arbitration provision and instead instituted a
sitdown strike which was in direct violation of the contract. The court
commented:
Obviously, a chief purpose of the arbitration agreement was
to avoid a strike. When the unions embarked upon the strike
they voluntarily by-passed arbitration. When they struck the
wrong was done and the damage to plaintiff began. Then it was
that plaintiff's right of action for damages and injunctive relief to
prevent further damage accrued."'
The Seventh Circuit proceeded on the basis that, notwithstanding
the fact that the contract provided that arbitration was the exclusive
remedy available to the parties, the union, when it called the strike,
was in default of its own agreement and had repudiated arbitration,
and having done so, was in no position to assert that the claim for
damages arising out of the strike was arbitrable.
The decision of the Seventh Circuit seems to be sound law. As the
Supreme Court implied in Lincoln Mills, the arbitration provisions in
the contract are the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause. Moreover,
the normal grievance procedure and arbitration provision is intended
and designed as a peaceful means of settling the day-to-day disputes
that can and do arise under union agreements. A strike in violation of
the arbitration and no-strike clauses in an agreement constitutes a
repudiation of the grievance procedure as well as a violation of the
82 235 F.2d 108, 30 L.C. 70,004 (7th cir. 1956).
83 Id. at 111.
84 Ibid.
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no-strike clause. While in a technical sense it might be said that an
employer can file a grievance against the union, it is also most likely
that the parties in providing such a procedure did not intend that a
lockout by the employer or a strike by the union in violation of the
contract constituted a grievance such as would be handled in the
various steps of the grievance procedure.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized such a
situation in Automobile Workers v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus-
tries.8 5 The agreement in that case provided that:
Shall difference arise between the Company and the Union
as to the meaning and application of this Agreement, or should
any local trouble arise, an earnest effort shall be made to
settle such differences, and it is agreed by the Union that there
shall be no strike, slowdown, or stoppage of work on the part
of the Union or its members and there shall be no lockout on
the part of the Company during the term of this contract. The
parties shall in all instances resort to the following steps of the
grievance procedure.88
Here again was a contract which impliedly provided that the griev-
ance procedure was the exclusive means for settling all differ-
ences. The union, in support of its motion for a stay of proceedings,
argued that the company's claim for damages was a "difference"
within the purview of the arbitration clause. The court, citing its own
previous decision in Hoover Motor Express Cr. v. Teamsters, 7 held:
In the commonly accepted meaning of the term 'grievance,'
violation of a no-strike provision in a collective bargaining
agreement does not constitute a grievance, and the violation of
the no-strike agreement of the collective bargaining contract is
not a grievance.88
The court, also recognizing the fundamental interdependence
between the no-strike clause and the arbitration clause, observed:
The arbitration called for by this paragraph of the contract
was to be used instead of a strike, not to determine whether the
strike was justified after it had occurred. The right to strike was
not arbitrable issue under this paragraph of the contract.8 9
This appears to be the law at least in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits. If, as is agreed, arbitration is the quid pro quo for
the "no strike" clause then there is no basis for arbitration in strike
damage cases.
A contrary view was taken by the District Court for New Jersey
85 242 F.2d 536 (6th cir. 1957) cert. denied 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
86 d. at 538.
87 217 F.2d 49, 27 L.C. 68,817 (6th cir. 1954).
88 Supra note 85, at 541.
89 Ibid.
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in Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. Electrical Workers, Local #437.90 In
this case, the union, after having admittedly called a strike in violation
of the arbitration and no-strike clauses, made a formal demand for
arbitration on the employer with respect to the employer's claim for
damages arising out of the illegal strike. The union moved for a stay
of proceedings, contending that the employer was in default in refusing
to arbitrate its strike damage claim against the union. The contract
in this case provided that:
All differences, disputes, and grievances between the parties
that are not satisfactorily settled after following the procedure
set forth shall, at the request of either party, be promptly sub-
mitted to arbiration.9 1
The court, in its opinion, distinguished between the grievance which
led to the strike and the new "dispute" arising out of the strike; that
is, the employer's claim for damages. The court found that the em-
ployer, and not the union, was in default of its arbitration obligation,
and stayed the proceeding.
There was another twist to the Tenney case which undoubtedly
influenced the court to reach its conclusion, in addition to the "dispute"
reference in the arbitration clause. The union alleged that the strike
was a wildcat strike for which it had no responsibility. The court stated:
It is this very issue of responsibility for this strike or work
stoppage which this Court has just found to be the proper
subject of arbitration, not of litigation -.9
This latter approach seems rather tenuous, since the agreement in the
Tenney case provided:
* * the Union will use all reasonable means to keep its em-
ployees at work and will not strike nor suffer its members to
engage in any strike, work stoppage, slowdown, sitdown, or
other interference with the ordinary operation of the Employer. 93
In any event, it would probably behoove contract negotiators who
do not want to waive their right to sue for damages in strike or lockout
situations to avoid contract provisions providing that "all disputes"
shall be subject to the arbitration provisions of the agreement.
Such "all disputes" provisions can be a liability to a union as well
as to an employer. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
held that, where such arbitration provisions exist, and even in the
absence of a specific no-strike clause, any strike with respect to a
dispute subject to arbitration under the contract, at least to the extent
90 174 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1959).
91 Id. at 879.
92 Id. at 881.
93 Id. at 879.
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that the contracting employer is not in default in proceeding with
arbitration, is a breach of that contract for which damages may be
awarded against the union.94
V. State Courts Under 301
The question arises as to where the state courts stand in relation to
301. Do the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over contract
violation suits affecting commerce, or do the state courts retain the
jurisdiction they previously had, the federal courts simply constituting
an additional forum? If the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
what are the rights of removal and remand?
It now seems quite clear that, in contract violation cases not involv-
ing any unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In the leading
case of McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Car-
penters,9 5 the court held that, while Lincoln Mills required that federal
law be applied, Section 301 does not grant exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts. The California court concluded that, while the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prevented the federal courts from issuing an injunction
against a contract violation strike, such a prohibition did not extend to
the state courts. If McCarroll and certain federal court decisions are
correct with respect to the applicability of Norris-LaGuardia to con-
tract violation strikes, it could be expected that employers in certain
jurisdictions would be attracted to the state courts. It appears, however,
that such forum shopping is not possible unless the defendant is agree-
able to have the state court litigate the issue. Actions for violations of
contracts in industries affecting commerce brought in the state court
can be removed by either party to a federal court.96
In the State of Wisconsin, under the Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act, contract violations are an unfair labor practice over which the
State Board has jurisdiction. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin on petition by the employer removed a proceeding
from the State Board to the federal court on the theory that the
proceeding before the State Board was in reality a simple suit based on
an alleged violation of the union-management agreement; that this was
the only violation of law alleged; and that the union could have brought
the identical action in the state trial courts rather than before an admin-
istrative tribunal. The Wisconsin court held that the creation by a
state of a special remedy as an alternative to a traditional court action
94 Mead v. Teamsters, 230 F.2d 576 (1st cir. 1956) ; see also Gay's Express v.
Teamsters, 169 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. MTass. 1959).
95 49 Cal.2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957) cert. denied 355 U.S. 932 (1958).96 Ingraham Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 260, 171 F. Supp. 103 (D. Conn.
1959) ; Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) ;
Underwood Corp. v. Electrical Workers Local 267, 171 F. Supp. 102 (D.
Conn. 1959).
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cannot operate to deprive a man of the right to have the cause heard
in a federal court.9 7
However, it would seem rather simple for a union to frustrate
removal by having an individual employee, instead of the union, file
the charge alleging the contract violation with the State Board. Since
Section 301 applies only to suits by and against labor organizations,
there would seem to be no basis for removal of such action to the
federal court. Whether or not an individual employee could bring an
action in state court to compel arbitration of his grievance is an issue
not within the purview of this article, although it would appear that,
since the individual employee is not a party to the contract, he is in
no position to compel the union and the employer to arbitrate unless
there is bad faith on the part of the union in refusing to handle his
individual grievance.
What about the removal of an action brought by the union in a state
court to enforce contract provisions dealing with wages, vacations,
holiday pay, and discharges of employees? The United States Supreme
Court, in the Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees. v.. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,98 held that the federal courts under Section 301
do not have jurisdiction over actions:
* * based upon an employer's failure to comply with the terms
of a collective agreement relating to compensation, terms pecu-
liar in the individual benefit which is their subject matter and
which, when violated, give a cause of action to the individual
employee.99
The principle distinction made in the various decisions is that Sec-
tion 301 gives jurisdiction in contract violation cases involving matters
which directly and primarily affect the complaining union as an organi-
zation, and procedural matters about the proper administration of the
collective bargaining process for which the union as the bargaining
agent is responsible. Issues involving "uniquely personal rights of an
employee" are not within the purview of Section 301, and the federal
courts will not take jurisdiction over such contract disputes. Courts,
in applying Section 301, seem to be following the concept set forth by
Justice Jackson in J. I. Case Co.100 relating to the difference between
an employment agreement and a collective bargaining agreement which
was characterized as a trade agreement.1 1
97 Machinists Lodge 78 v. General Electric Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis.
1959).
98 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
99 Id. at 460.
100 Supra note 18.
101 Interestingly enough, Justice Frankfurter wrote what amounts to the majority
opinion in Westinghouse, in which opinion he characterized §301 as being
largely procedural and not providing a basis for the federal courts to apply
substantive law. Justice Frankfurter took this same position in his dissent in
Lincoln Mills. Justice Douglas, who dissented in Westinghouse, wrote the
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The line between the two, however, is not as clear as may seem at
first glance. For instance, does a suit by a union alleging violation by
an employer of his obligation to make contributions to a welfare fund
involve the union as an organization or the uniquely personal interests
of the employees? The U. S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that it had jurisdiction over such an action "since it
involves an obligation running to a union and, therefore, it is a union
controversy and not a uniquely personal right of employees sought to
be enforced by a union."' 0 2
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in the New Park
Mining case 0 3 that the federal courts had jurisdiction of an action
between an employer and a union predicated on alleged violation of
union contract by discharge of employees and leasing of mining opera-
tions. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination
as to whether or not the leasing and discharges were made in good faith
or were merely subterfuge to evade the collective bargaining agreement.
The decisions of the Tenth Circuit in U. S. Potash and New Park
Mining pose the question of whether or not an employer violates the
"recognition" clause of a union-management agreement by going out
of business or by transferring his operations to another area for the
specific purpose of reducing labor costs. If that is found to be the law,
judicial inventiveness will have reached its ultimate. It in effect would
require an employer to remain in business for the period of the union
agreement so that the union, at least during that period, will have mem-
bers who will continue to pay dues.
Conclusion
It can be expected that the rash of union-management contract dis-
pute cases that 'have hit the federal courts since the Lincoln Mills
decision is only the beginning. The federal courts, having been given
the broad mandate in Lincoln Mills to fashion a body of substantive
law in the area of union-management contract disputes, have had a
tremendous burden placed upon them. Free collective bargaining rather
than government fiat remains the backbone of federal industrial
relations policy. As indicated by the cases cited in this article, the execu-
tion of a union-management agreement does not settle all the issues.
Section 301, is available to help the parties peacefully, if not without
litigation, to live with their agreements.
majority opinion in Lincoln Mills. While Frankfurter's views with respect to
the issues concerning procedural versus substantive law were settled in favor
of federal action in Lincoln Mills, the basic holding in Westinghouse with
respect to the union's rights to use the federal courts to vindicate the private
rights of individual members consistently has been followed by the lower
courts.
3.0 United Construction Workers v. Electro Chemical Engraving Co., 37 L.C.
65,709 (July 1959).
103 Supra note 51.
1960]
